Introduction
The roles of the public sector vary across nations and change over time. Many countries of Western Europe underwent a gradual shift towards a managerial style of public management associated with an increased focus on the effectiveness and efficiency of the public sector (Bovaird, Loffler, 2003) . The reforms gave rise to new challenges, in particular a need for horizontal coordination between public sector organisations and a requirement for methods to evaluate the achievement of public goals. A similar shift has been taking place in transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe, but with a considerable lag, which allows these countries to adopt management control systems by reference to other countries, where such systems are already in place (Czaputowicz, 2008) . This paper presents the case of Poland and the attempts of the Polish government to introduce new, risk-based management control systems across the public sector. We contribute exploratory empirical studies of the new systems and suggest a spectrum of research opportunities which arise from the described setting.
A reform of public sector control systems was one of the challenges associated with the accession of Poland to the European Union in 2004. Since the Polish public sector was to become a major beneficiary of EU structural funds, the European Commission requested that the distribution of these funds and the effects of their use be systematically controlled. Chapter 28 of the pre-accession negotiations specified that Poland would implement a decentralised control system based on Public Internal Financial Control, a framework developed by the European Court of Auditors. At the time, the Minister of Finance decided to broaden the scope of the system to include all of the public sector. Since 2010 the new management control system has become compulsory for all public sector institutions (The Public Finance Act).
The new control system is a major innovation, if not a revolution, associated with the modernisation of management methods in the public sector and an increased focus on effectiveness. Previously, the word "control" used to be associated with institutional control, carried out by dedicated organisations, e.g. the Supreme Audit Office
The new management control framework in Poland
The need for a new management control system in Poland arose from two sources: accession to the EU and the transition towards a managerial style of public management. While the European Commission did request Public Internal Financial Control to be adopted before Poland would obtain access to European Union Structural Funds, it did not require that all of the Polish public sector adopt similar solutions. The decision of the Ministry of Finance, and then of the Parliament, to include this requirement in the Public Finance Act of 2009 seems to have been motivated by changing perceptions of the role of the public sector in Poland 1 . It was a major victory for the proponents of the new control framework, a group of internal auditors at the Ministry of Finance. They had attempted a softer approach, by requiring organisations to establish internal audit departments which were charged with analysing control systems and risk management systems. Audit departments were required by successive amendments to the Public Finance Act in 2001 and 2005. Changing social perceptions regarding the role of the state are a major driving force behind the evolution of the Polish public sector. Similar processes have been observed in other countries and reported in international scholarly literature (Hood, 2010; Schick, 2004) . In Poland the evolution began with a lag, because reforms started only after the fall of communism. Although limited reforms of control systems were considered in the 1980's, the crisis of the regime made it impossible to introduce them effectively (Kuc, Kantorowicz, 2002) . As Poland gradually integrated with the European Union, both the public officers and the wider public became aware of different models of public management being introduced in other countries. Moreover, the democratisation of the state gave rise to a need for legitimisation on the part of all public institutions. As a result, the public sector was put under pressure to prove its usefulness and to gain public trust (van de Walle, Bouckaert, 2003) so the new control framework appeared to actors beyond the internal audit departments to be one of the tools to achieve that goal.
However, the transformation towards a new model of public management causes new problems to occur. International comparative research shows that the methods for defining and achieving public sector performance vary significantly across countries ( Van de Walle, 2009) . One major problem is the definition of effectiveness or performance itself (Van de Walle, Bouckaert, 2007) . This is probably most vivid when one considers the variety of functions public institutions perform. For example, a local government unit deals not only with solving important local issues, such as developing public infrastructure or assuring sustainable growth, but it also requires inhabitants to obtain documents, permissions, and sometimes punishes them with 66 Karol Marek Klimczak, Anna Pikos fines for misconduct. Public officers struggle between alternative, often contradictory dimensions of effectiveness: quality, following the law, timeliness and customer satisfaction.
It seems that the authors of the new management control framework at the Ministry of Finance were aware of these challenges to successful adoption of the new framework when they decided to allow organisations to adapt the system to their specific contexts and needs. They have made an effort to provide public officers with general guidance on management control systems through publications on the Ministry website, and they organised conferences and meetings. They did not simply impose a ready-made, one-size-fits-all system, which might have been expected given the Ministry's formalistic approach to other regulatory solutions. In 2004, the Ministry obtained funds from EU Transition Facility programme No. 2004/016-829.01 .08 which allowed it to train the first internal auditors in risk management and carry out pilot studies at five major public sector organisations including a ministry, a university and a hospital. At that time, the Ministry decided to follow the British model and translated the Orange Book (HM Treasury, 2004) and then develop its own guidelines on that basis. The choice of a foreign model, in particular an Anglo-Saxon one, seems to increase the chance of successful translation, because Polish culture welcomes innovations from "the West", the cultural area to which Polish elites aspire.
The Orange Book describes a management control system which is based on the analysis and assessment of risk. The system is called risk management and is presented as a highly sophisticated management control system spanning the entire organisation. It needs to be set in the specific organisational context, including the wider economic, social and institutional environment. Each organisation needs to define its position within that context and then define its goals which may be affected by risk. At this point, the day-to-day risk management process takes over. Risks pertaining to all goals of the organisation need to be identified, and the identification process should be repeated systematically. Then, risks need to be assessed so that they can be compared against the organisation's risk appetite. Next, the organisation needs to make a decision regarding the appropriate reaction to each risk. The reaction may range from acceptance, through control, to risk transfer or termination of the risky activity. The process of risk management needs to be repeated periodically, monitored and evaluated in terms of its effectiveness 2 . It is meant to be an embedded, self-learning process, leading to a gradual improvement of the organisation's effectiveness.
Even though the choice of the normative model developed from a highly regarded foreign institution and embedding the requirement to adopt the new control framework in the public finance act are clear victories for the proponents of the innovation, significant challenges persist. Public sector organisations may still avoid adoption of the new system by engaging in concealing strategies (Oliver, 1991 by the Supreme Audit Office in Poland, so even the supreme control institution has not embraced the new framework yet. Other central institutions have resisted changes as well, notably other ministries. One note-worthy exception is the Polish National Bank which enthusiastically implemented a risk management system, but the central bank followed the standards of the banking industry rather than the public sector standards. Adoption is even more challenging at lower levels of the public sector, partly because of its complexity. For example, local government units enjoy a wide autonomy as do some government agencies, but traditional branches of the government, such as taxation, are centralised. Thus, the new framework can be quickly adopted in the centralised branches if the central body chooses to adopt it, but the autonomous organisations cannot be forced to implement the system. Interestingly however, anecdotal evidence seems to indicate that it is the autonomous local governments, in particular well-resourced city councils, which are the most interested in adopting the innovation. Perhaps this is a result of the proximity to their constituents, who can exert pressure to increase effectiveness of the city councils.
Adoption of risk management systems
From the inception of the new management control system, it was apparent that the first challenge in the adoption of the innovation is the creation of risk management systems, which were previously unknown in the Polish public sector. It was also clear that the implementation of risk management systems in the Polish environment requires modifications of the standard implementation model, with further adjustments for each specific organisation. An adapted version of the general implementation model found in ISO 31000 (Klimczak, 2009 ) is used as the conceptual basis for the two research studies described below. The model brings attention to the key success factors identified during the implementation of projects and interactions with public officials. According to previous research, the first challenge is to obtain full support of the top management (Kane, Patapan, 2006) . A particularly efficient method seems to be the allocation of the oversight of the risk management process to a clearly identified senior officer. The second challenge is to create a foundation for the new system in the wider context of management control systems in the organisation. A major obstacle was identified at this point: the lack of product orientation in the public sector. Polish law continues to support the traditional view of public sector entities as organisations performing certain tasks ("zadania"), rather than delivering products or achieving specific goals ("cele") The third critical element of the implementation is to design the system and position it within the organisation's structure and culture. Major challenges that arise in this area are the allocation of decision privileges and accountability, the creation of effective communication channels and the allocation of resources to the new system. Anecdotal evidence suggests that many institutions centralise decision making in the area of modifying controls, which makes it impossible to deal with risk at the operational level. Other institutions decentralise decision making to risk owners, but tend not to provide them with sufficient resources or procedures to obtain such resources. In many cases the communication of risk vertically to the risk owner encountered cultural and organisational barriers. Moreover, research findings suggest that senior managers may disregard the information provided by the new system if the system does not fit the characteristics of the organisation (Moynihan, Pandey, 2010) . So far, anecdotal evidence indeed confirms that senior managers do not perceive risk as a major problem and they do not see the need for innovation in control systems.
Once the new system is launched, the success of the implementation rests on a systematic engagement of all involved parties throughout the process. In too many cases Risk-based management control in the public sector in Poland 69 risk management turns out to be a one-off activity which concludes with the creation of a lengthy risk register, never to be used again. Typically no decisions regarding controls would be made and employees who are engaged in risk analysis would not receive any feedback. In one particular case, a large organisation created a risk register of hundreds of entries, in which all risks were assessed exactly at the tolerance level. Apparently, everyone wanted to perform the task of risk analysis, but no-one wanted to face the consequences of identifying an unacceptable risk in their area of responsibility, which would be a typical example of a compromise strategy (Oliver, 1991) .
Empirical studies of Polish public sector officers
The purpose of the empirical studies reported below is to provide exploratory evidence regarding risk management adoption in Polish public sector. The first study stems from the initial positivist approach, described in the preceding section. It documents the level of implementation and identifies problems associated with it at the early stage of the reforms. However, the results of that study inspired a specific research question concerning the motivations of actors: do public sector officers perceive risk as a significant issue to be managed? The second study shows that risk perception among public sector officers is in fact lower than in the private sector. A description of the studies and the results follows below.
First reactions to the new reforms
The first study of risk management in the Polish public sector was designed as a survey directed at all public sector institutions. The survey, along with a cover letter was sent by mail to 3,800 organisations in September and October 2008. The cover letter requested that a person charged with risk management or the internal auditor fill in the survey. The survey is one page long and contains 10 questions regarding risk management, plus 4 questions regarding the organisation itself. Only two questions are open-ended, while the other ones require the respondents to mark their answers on Lickert scales, and in one case to mark yes or no. Responses could be sent by mail, email, fax or the survey could be filled out online. The response rate was low, with only 117 surveys returned. With that in mind, over a hundred responses is a relatively good outcome, considering that risk management was at a very early stage at the time of the survey. Nevertheless, the sample is not representative and results should be viewed as preliminary indicators of underlying phenomena. The response counts for questions regarding the level of implementation are presented in table 1. Just over a third of respondents rated their risk management implementation at a positive level. On the other hand, two-thirds expected effectiveness gains from implementing the system. Respondents were also asked whether risk is already being assessed by internal audit, which can facilitate the implementation. Again, a third of responses were positive. The main objective of the survey is to identify common problems with the implementation of risk management systems. The level of implementation was expected to be low at the time of the survey, and to change in the future as a result of government policy if the policy addressed the problems correctly. Respondents identified problems with human resources as the prime problem: overburdening of employees who perform risk management functions on top of their usual activities and lack of motivation on the part of employees whose participation in the process is required (table 2) . Somewhat less emphasis was put on the lack of specialised knowledge on the part of employees charged with risk management. Insufficient IT resources and lack of top management support received the lowest ratings.
T h i s c o p y i s f o r p e r s o n a l u s e o n l y -d i s t r i b u t i o n p r o h -
Respondents were also asked to answer an open-ended question regarding the problems. The largest number of comments focused on the lack of motivation on the part of other employees and their lack of knowledge and understanding as to what risk management is and of what it can help the organisation achieve. Another problem mentioned here was the lack of top management support, as one respondent put it: "the top management knows we need risk management procedures but they put it off till «later»" (apostrophes used by the respondent). One respondent, employed in local government, complained of the council, rather than the management, not being responsive to requests for additional resources needed for risk management to function. To obtain a different perspective on the problems with risk management implementation we asked respondents what advice they would offer other institutions. A few respondents underlined the need for risk management to be set on the foundation of good management, after issues of organisational structure and information flow have been resolved. Some respondents raised the issue of a clear allocation of responsibility and the need for high quality, understandable and clear procedures. One respondent wrote that a project team needs to be established, and it should include at least one member from the top management, so that other employees respect their effort to implement the risk management system and more employees actively engage in the process.
Risk perception of public sector officers
After the exploratory survey study provided evidence of low motivation and lack of support for risk management, a natural next question to ask was why public sector managers do not feel the need to implement this system. One potential reason is that the perception of risk in their organisations is low, perhaps lower than in the private sector, which is suggested by extant research (Bellante, Link, 1981; Roszkowski, Grable, 2009 ). However, previous research did not document risk perception relating to the participants' work environment. Since risk perception is context-specific (Hanoch et al., 2006) , we designed a study where the risk perception measure is derived from subjective probabilities assigned by participants to short scenarios of potential risks associated with their organisations. Note that an alternative solution would be to ask participants to choose between alternative decisions of which one is more risky than the other (Macko, Tyszka, 2009 ), but that approach would lead us to measure the propensity for risk taking, rather than the subjective judgements of the probability at which risks may occur.
The sample consists of 104 respondents (71 women and 33 men), recruited from among students of five different executive programmes taught at Kozminski University. One half of the respondents are public sector employees while the other half 72 Karol Marek Klimczak, Anna Pikos worked in the private sector at the time of the study. Respondents were handed sheets with 24 risk scenarios associated with their organisation (Appendix 1). Over 20 minutes they were asked to rank their subjective probability of each risk by making a mark on a 10 cm scale from 0 (impossible) to 100% (certain). This design requires more work in data coding (each rating needs to be measured with a ruler) but reduces the impact of the scale design on the responses collected (French et al., 2006) . Risk perception is measured for each participant as the sum of the probabilities assigned by the participant to all scenarios. The results are scaled so that the observed scores can range from 0 to 1500.
The analysis of the collected data shows that the public sector employees' perception of risks relating to their organisations is lower than in the private sector. The mean risk perception score among public sector employees is 483, while among private sector employees it is 803. The difference between the means remains large regardless of gender groups. Next, we performed factor analysis to identify the scenarios which had the greatest impact on risk perception scores. We identified four principal components that fulfilled the Kaiser criterion (with eigenvalues from 1.22 to 9.88), of which the first component explains 40% of the sample variance. Each factor was assigned a label that best summarised scenarios contained in it, although the label should be treated only as a generalisation (table 3) . Next, we needed to determine which scenarios should be included in each factor. To that end we used varimax rotation to identify scenarios with loadings below 0.50 (scenarios 1, 6 and 13) which were then dropped from further analysis. Note that factor analysis allows one variable to be shared by two or more factors, which is the case for scenarios 2 and 17. To visualise the difference between the means in the two groups we computed t-tests for the equality of means between the public and private sector groups for scenarios included in each factor. Since the data are not generated from a random sample, the results should only be treated as indicative and no p-values are given for the rejection of the null hypothesis. 
Discussion and conclusion
The two studies described above portray the new, risk-based management control system as a major innovation. While the sponsors of the system at the Ministry of Finance are convinced that it can be a vehicle for change, public sector officers who are required to implement the new system do not seem to be concerned with risk. In light of extant research in management control systems one can predict that organisations will present a range of institutional responses to the innovation (Oliver, 1991) . On the one end of the spectrum are passive conformists, who may adopt the new system and fulfil the requirements but never use it for management purposes. Other organisations may use the new system to preserve the status quo by creating a formal model of management control aligned with the status quo (Almqvist et al., 2011) . On the other end of the spectrum are organisations, in particular the powerful central government agencies and ministries, which actively defy the new regulations or attempt to modify the regulation by exerting pressure on the Ministry of Finance. The contingency approach can be used to find the determinants of response choice.
Since the reform affects a wide variety of public sector organisations, this setting can be used to carry out in-depth research into the adoption process using nondeterministic theories which can explain the dynamics of the adoption process (Baxter, Chua, 2003) . Previous studies have shown that different responses can occur even within a single public sector organisation, when it is large enough (Hyvonen et al., 2009) . For example, actor-network theory can be used as a conceptual framework to analyse the adoption process. The advantage of that approach is that it models the adoption process as a network of multiple activities taken by various actors located across the organisation and in its environment (Alcouffe et al., 2008) . Responses to our survey definitely point to interactions between actors as a significant element of the adoption process. Problems of support by senior management or local legislature, as well as lack of motivation on the part of line managers have all been mentioned. The Polish case can also be seen as an example of the role of boundary objects (Briers, Chua, 2001) , in this case the British and EU models of management control which are used by the proponents of the reforms.
Another promising research approach is to examine the new system in relation to existing control practices, methods and systems, or as one element of the organisation's control mix (Abernethy, Chua, 1996) . At present, Polish public sector organisations are characterised by top-down decision making, delegation of specific tasks and limited feedback from line managers or other stakeholders. While this decreases the likelihood of the new management control system becoming a significant element in organisational decision-making, the organisations where this will happen can provide unique research data. One particular issue which may be of interest is the evolution of the internal audit profession, which has recently been created but has the ambition of becoming an agent for change in the public sector through effectiveness audits and consulting. It attempts to distance itself from the incumbent internal control bodies,
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The problem can also be approached from the perspective of individual actors or groups of actors, which increases the observed variety of characteristics and responses. We began this line of research with the risk perception study. While we show that public sector officials are in general characterised by lower risk perception, the same research method can be used to determine differences in risk perception among officials. Management accounting research describes other individual and job characteristics that may have an impact on the effects of control systems: outcome controllability, ambiguity and uncertainty or perceived fairness of the system. Considerable progress in this area has been made by studies of performance evaluation systems and their effects on performance (Hartmann, Slapničar, 2011; Lau, Sholihin, 2005; Sven, 2001) .
The experiment with management control systems in Poland offers a range of research opportunities for researchers in the fields of management accounting and public management. We provide initial evidence on the diffusion of this innovation, which indicates that the system is at an initial stage of diffusion. However, the determination and apparent strength of the system's proponents at the Ministry of Finance, who managed to include this system in the Public Finance Act, lead us to believe that it will not be abandoned. Researchers can observe as the system is translated and adapted to various organisations and organisational units and use that data to answer fundamental questions pertaining to the adoption of management control innovations.
